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"The policy of the Government of the United States
is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent
safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial
and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed
to friendly Powers by treaty and international law. and
safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire ."
-Honorable John Hay, Secretary o£ State, 1900.
"It therefore will be necessary for the United States
to decide whether it will actively move to compel a satisfactory solution. or will permit American interests to
continue to drift on the current of events; whether it will
formulate its own policy, or have one thrust upon it;
\\·hether it will lead or follow. That the United States
must have an Asiatic policy cannot be doubtful."
-Thomas F. Millard.
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AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR
FAIR PLAY IN CHINA

HISTORICAL OUTLINE
1784-First American ship in Canton Harbor.
1844-First treaty between the United States and China. Americans to trade at five new
ports; definite statement of principle of extraterritoriality; 5% tariff.
1859-Treaty between the United States and China, subsequent to treaty of Tientsin between China and France and Great Britain. Eight new ports opened; reduction of
tariff; toleration of Christianity; establishment of American Ministry at Peking.
1863-Municipal Council at Shanghai elected by Americans and British.
1867-Chinese Mission to foreign countries; Burlingame, American Minister, a member.
1868-First American Immigration Law.
1880--Limitation of Chinese immigration, and American undertaking to refrain from
opium traffic.
1883-Treaty of Friendship and Commercl' with Korea.
1885-Excess portion of Taiping Indemnity remitted.
1894-Service of the United States to Japan and China, in attempting to avert war between
them, and as custodian of their intl."rests during the war.
1899-The Open Door Policy.
1900--The Boxer Uprising. Terms of the protocol of 1901 applying to the United States:
Permission to maintain military force in Peking Legation; to contribute to joint
guard at Tientsin, and along Peking-Tientsin Railway; $25,000,000 indemnity.
1903-Commcrcial treaty between United States and China, providing for: Raising of
Chinese import and export tariffs to an effective 5%; abolition of likin.
1904-Request of United States that Russia and Japan respect Chinese neutrality during
the war.
1905-Agreement on the part of the United States to a Japanese protectorate for Korea.
Mediation of United States between Japan and Russia, bringing war to close.
1908-Remission of $11,000,000 of Boxer Indemnity, the amount over actual loss.
1909-Rejection by Russia and· Japan of Secretary Knox's proposal to neutralize the
Manchurian railways.
1911-The Chinese Revolution. No formal support from United States; assistance of
individual Americans-Homer Lea, Paul Linebarger, etc.; tradition of Admiral
Mark Bristol's friendliness and tact towards revolutionary leaders.
1913-Recognition by United States of Chines<.' Republic.
1915-United States' protest to Japan and China oYer the "Twenty-one Demands."
1917-The Lansing-Tshii Agreement, recognizi11g Japan's "special interests" in China.
United States' successful attempt to enroll China in the war against Germany.
1918-Efforts of United States to secure the restoration of Shantung to China at the Versailles Conference, unsuccessful.
1920--Conference of International Consortorium of Bankers, headed by American group.
Negative result, due to exclusion of Chinese bankers from their plans.
1921-22-Washington Disarmament Conference.
1924-Remission of final portion of Boxer Indemnity to China.*
1925-Tariff Conference.
1926-Report from Extraterritoriality Commission.
1927-Porter Resolution passed by Congress, recommending revision of unilateral treaties.
Statement of independent American policy by Secretary Kellogg. Proposal by
Secretary Kellogg to contending Chinese factions to eliminate Shanghai from the
war area. rejected. Presentation of identic notes to Eugene Chen by the five major
powers, demanding reparations for the violence and destruction at Nanking.
1928-Failure of Morgan project to loan $30,000,000 to the South Manchurian Railway.
United States' support of Japanese stand to retain central customs administration
at Peking, as tending to emphasize unity of China. Temporary status of marines
in China altered March 1st to permanent status. Adjustment between Nanking
Government and United States of demands for reparation following the Nanking
trouble last year.
*This sum. about $3 .000,000, is secured by the maritime customs. It Is being used, at our
: ..commendation, for educational purposes, through the China Foundation for the Promotion of
fo:ducation and Culture. This Foundation maintains the China Institute In New York, s upports
the Metropolitan Library at Peking, and distributes prizes for scientific achievements, and grants
to educational institutions In China.
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There are two sources from which one may acquire a conception as to the nature of
the policy of this country towards China: State documents, and the course of event .
The purpose of this report is to examine both ources, to note consistencies and inconsistencies, and in the light of what has happened. to summarize the pres·ent American
policy.

NATURE O F AMERICAN INTERESTS IN CHINA
The nature of the policy of the United States towards China has been
logically determined by the character of our interests in China. These have
been confined almost entirely to trade and cultural actiYities. During the 19th
century, while European and Japanese colonial expansion was progressing at
so rapid a rate in China, the United States was occupied with the vast task
of expansion on the North American continent. If we had been an established
nation at that time, perhaps we, too, would have acquired a vast indignation
at the murder of missionaries and soothed ourselves with territorial grants.
As it is, the United States has no leased territories. possessions, nor concessions in China. Our total investment, missionary and commercial. amounts to
a little more than half of our trade with China during 1926. which totaled
$253.363,129.
Because we have not a lienated Chinese territory, we have been spared
bloodshed and the reputation of foreign aggressor, which has applied to every
other major power represented in China. We have relied instead upon friendship and persuasion, and this course has created for our country much genuine
good-will among the Chinese. Our material investment being smaller, \Ve
have been more free to pursue a progressive and liberal course. And·yet, because we are in a sense a graft onto the original stock of rooted foreign interests in China, we must ever seek to conciliate Japan in the north, and England
and France in central and south China. These powers wi ll modify our policy
as long as they maintain their holdings in China.

INTERCOURSE BETWEEN THE UNITE D STATES AND CHINA
Long before diplomatic relations were established between the United
States and China, trade flourished between Canton and the New England
ports. By 1810 thirty-seven American ships were anchored in Canton harbor.
Our first treaties with China (1844 and 1859) followed up the advantages
won by Great Britain ·and France in their wars with China. By invoking
the most-favored-nation clause, we were enabled to trade on equal terms
\Yith Europeans at all the treaty ports, although we had fought no battles
and made no enemies. Our first minister was appointed to Peking by the
terms of the treaty of 1859.
Our early contacts with China had been determined by trade expediency.
Closer associations, the development of California, and the expansion of trade,
made these more frequent and complex. The "friendship policy" began to
emerge. In 1868 the first American 1mmigration Act was passed, granting
to Chinese the right of citizenship and free residence in the United States.
and affirming "the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home
and allegiance and also the mutual advantage of free immigration and emigration." In 1880 \Ye agreed not to engage in the opium trade. A few years
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later, Congress returned to China almost half of the Taiping indemnity of
::00.000 taels, the amount ab(l\·e actual loss sustained hy .\merican mterest.
during the Taiping Rebel lion.
The war between Japan and China (1894-95) accelerated the impending
break-up of China. Formosa was ceded to Japan. Russia demanded the
lease of Darien and Port Arth ur. Kwanc howwan was leased to France, and
Gr eat Britain demanded the lease of Kowloon and \tVei-hai-wei. The future
was not promisinig either for Chinese independence or Amer ican trade . Accordingly John Hay proposed his famous "Open Door" policy, which ·w as
accepted by all of the powers . Its three stip ul ations we r e:
(1 ) Treaty ports or vested interests shall be free from all in terference on the part
of the power within whose " sphere of influence" such ports or interests are located.
(2) The Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply to all merchandise landed
or shipped to all such ports as are within said " sphere of interest," and the duties shall
be collected by· the Chinese Government.
(3) Discriminatory dues and charges shall not be levied against merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of powers other than the power dominating said "sphere" .

T his poli cy was desig n ed to r egul at e th e adm inistratio ns of t he power s
in t heir severa l "spher es" of infl u ence. It protect ed t hem from eac h oth er,
a nd pr evented th e partiti on of China. A nd it permitted A m erican trade t o
develop in a cou n try w her e we had n o t erritorial foo thold .
In 1901, d uri ng th e proceed ings whi ch fo llowed the Boxer Uprising,
t he U nit ed St a t es secured fr om the p owers involved fo rm a l agreement t o
the p rinciple of Chi na's territorial a nd a dministra tive sovereignty. In 1908
Co n gr e~s r emi tted t o Chin a n early half of our $25,000,000 s hare of the Boxer
I nd emnity, or t he a m ou nt in excess of our losses. A nd w hen in 1915 J apan
presented her fa mo us " Twenty-one D eman ds," we pr ot es ted again st certain
fea tures- to b e explici t , against t hose w hic h constit uted a n invasion of Great
B ritain 's sph er e of influ ence, a nd t hose w hi ch r equired Japa nese s upervisio n
of a large share of China's domestic admini stration .*
I n 1917, China at th e instigation of th e U nited Stat es, sever ed r elations
with Germ a ny, and later declar ed wa r. O ur Gover nm en t beli eved t hat as an
all y at th e Peace Confer ence, Chi na coul d more effecti vely ask fo r the restor ation of S ha ntung. O ur attempt to secur e th e r eturn of Shantung to Chi na at
Versaill es was unsuccessful, cl ue t o t he sec r et treaties wh ich J apan had made
with Gr eat Britai n and France in which t hey agreed to uphold her claims
to S hant ung. The Chinese delegates refused to sign the treaty.
In 1921 cam e the Washington Conference, where, at t he insistence of
the British and American delegates, the relations of the foreign {_)Owers with
*The original "Demands" includ<>d: (1) Transfer of German privileges in Shantung to Japan and
exclusiw• rights in Shantung. (2) Absolute freedom of residence and occupation for Japanese in
South Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia; Japanese subjects to b<> permitted to open mines in this
rPgion; JapanesE' GovE>rnmf'nt consent to be obtained on loans from a third Power for building
railway,; in this r~gion; political, financial, and military acl\'isers in this region to be Japanese;
Jpast>s of Port Arthur, Dalny, the South Manchurian Railway, and the Antung-Mukden Railway
to b<> extended to 99 years. (3) The Hanyehping Company (in the Yangtse valley) to be a joint
concern of Japan and China; no other mines in the neighborhood of those owned by said Company to be worked by persons outside of the Company w i thout its consent, and no undertaking
directly or indir<>ctly affecting its interests to b e carried out without its consent. (4) The Chinese
Go,·ernment not to cede or lease to a third Power any harbor or bay or island along the coast of
China. (5) The Chinese Government to employ Japanese advisers in political, financial, and m ilitary affairs; Chinese and .Japanese to administer jointly police departments in important places;
China to purchas<' a fixecl amount of munitions from Japan; Japanese approval required on
foreign loanH for the dPvelopment of Fukien province .
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China were reconsidered. Upon the treaties there drawn up are based the
present formal relations between China and the powers.
Out of the history of our intercourse with China have emerged three traditions: Pursuit of trade; defense of China's interests; and co-operation with
the other powers. By these principles our diplomatic course ha been guided;
and because they sometimes conflict rather badly, the history of our relations
with China is not the uninterrupted stream of benefits con~erred and received
that some have conceived it to be.
In the interests of trade, our nationals exist in China on the same basis
as other foreigners, whereby they receive privileges which we would never
freely grant to foreigners in our country. American goods may enter China
at rates fr 0m Sj'r to 107c. whereas Chinese goods entering our country must
be taxed at rates varying from 30% to 90%. The effects of our first friendly
immigration treaty were arbitrarily annulled by exclusion in 1904, and the
way in which the law has been applied at ports of entry has been most unfortunate.* Our attempts to prevent the war with Japan in 1894, and to spare
invasion of Chinese territory in 190+. were unsuccessful. \Ye agreed to sixteen
0f the twenty-one demands. the date of whose acceptance the Chinese obsen ·e
with national mourning. Our proposal that Chinese territorial and administrative sovereignty be respected is violated by the treaties in force, and
by the unauthorized measures which the powers, including the United
States, have chosen to consider necessary.
What good has our policy brought China? We have kept bad fro m
going to worse. We have not kept money that did not belong to us. And
we have made an effort to bring about moderate reforms in the general
fore ig n policy of the powers.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE
A t the Wash ington Conference summoned by Presiden Harding in
1921, various treat ies were drawn up between the nine powers represented,
towards the adoption of "a policy designed to stabil ize conditions in the Far
East, t o safegua r d t he r ig hts and interests of China, and to pr omote intercourse bet ween China and the other powers on the basis of equality of opportunit y." The main agr eements outlined in the treaties were:
(1) Respect of China 's sovereignty, independence, and ter ritorial and administrative
integrity.
(2) China to receive the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity t o develop and
maintain for herself an effective and stable government.
(3) Armed force s maintained by the powers in China without treaty sanction were
to be withdrawn whenever China should a ssure the protection of the lives a nd property of
foreigners in China.
•
( 4) A Tariff Commission representing those countries participating in the tr eaties,
and others trading with China on the old treaty basis, was to meet in conference fo r the
consideration of the best means of effecting revisions in the scale of tariff duties, and of
*By the Act of 1924, American citizens of Chinese race may not even bring their wives to
this country from China. Because there are fewer Chinese women than men in this country,
many thou sands of Amer ican citizens must either give up their residence here, or remain single.
A bill to remedy this situation, sponsored by Congressman Dyer, has been pending before Congress for two years.
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reforming the administration of the customs with a view to granting China ultimate
tariff autonomy.
(5) Another Commission similarly formed, was to be appointed for the investigation of China's claims that Extraterritoriality sh9uld be abolished.
(6) Foreign postal agencies were to be replaced by a Chinese system.
(7) Japan was to relinquish her political control of Shantung, and to give the
Chinese an opportunity to redeem the Shantung railway.
(8) Great Britain was to restore \Vei-hai-wei to China. (The lease expired in 1923.)

The psychological effect of the vVashington Conference Treaties was
Yery great, but the first force of their promises was weakened by the three
years' delay in ratifying them. occasioned by the insistence of the French
Government that payment still due on her share of the Boxer Indemnity be
in gold francs of the standard of 1901.
The Tariff Conference met in the fall of 1925. Its sessions were suspended after several months, due to unsettled conditions in north China,
which, however, were not so serious as to prevent the Chinese Governmnt
from paying the costs of the Conference. As a result of the deliberations,
tariff autonomy was deferred for three years (until January, 1929); the customs rates in the meantime were adjusted to an effective 5% with surtaxes
from Zy;;% to 5% on luxuries; while the eventual going into effect of the
Chinese national tariff law was to be dependent upon the abolition of likin.
In 1926, the Extraterritoriality Commission presented its report, in
which it approved relinquishment of extraterritorial privileges after the
Chinese judicial and prison systems should have been modernized· to the
degree deemed necessary by the Commission. It advocated the application
of Chinese laws wherever possible in consular courts, payment of authorized
Chinese taxes by foreigners, reforms in the administration of foreign courts,
etc. It was not empowered to put into effect any of its recommendations.
The foreign postal agencies were replaced by a Chmese system .
Japan relinquished her political hold on Shantung. She however retained
all the German mines and property rights she had seized during the war.
W ei-hai-wei has not yet been restored by the British, on the ground
that a responsible recipient has not yet been found. The lease expired five
years ago.
How effective has our "friendship policy" been since 1925. when the
Conference Treaties were ratified?
The Chinese have been collecting the duties and ·surtaxes approved by
the Customs Conference.
The British concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang were turned over early
in 1927 to joint Chinese and British control, not as a result of the dignified
grinding of Conference wheels, but because excited Chinese crowds demanded
it. and the British thought best not to "shoot their customers" but to pacify
them.

'

Page6
The Shanghai Municipal Council, supposedly at the insistence of the
hom.e governments, grant the Chinese three places on the main board, and
six places on sub-committees, and admit the Chinese to the public parks
at last.
The Porter Resolution, requesting that new treaties be drawn up between
the United States and China, to effect a revision of the unilateral status existing, ~as passed in Congress over a year ago, and has been gathering dust
ever smce.
A s for the guarantee of China's "territorial and administrative sovereignty," and the promises to "provide the fullest and most unembarrassed
opportunity to establish," etc., and to withdraw unauthorized troops upon
assurance that foreigners will be protected-these pledges have been violated
whenever the powers have conceived China's interests as opposed to their
0\Vl1.

OUR PRESENT POLICY
The main points of our pr ese nt Chin ese poli cy as summed up by Dr.
Stanley Hornbeck, Director of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, are:
(1) Assurance of equality of opportunity.
(2) Respect for China's sovereignty.
(3) Non-interference in China's domestic affairs.
(4) Non-aggression.
(5) Insistence that China perform the obligations of a sovereign state in protection
of foreign citizens.
(6) Co-operation with foreign powers.
He adds: " It should be obvious, however, that there may at any time arise a situa.tion in which it will not be possible to act in conformity with all of the implications
of each and all of these principles in every respect at one and the same time." And with
regard to the pledge of co-operation he says: "The theory of the co-operative policy
does not require that in whatsoever direction one or more powers may wish to proceed
the others must go; and the express commitments with regard to co-operation are commitments individually and collectively to refrain from aggression. The principle of independent action may be applied properly where such unanimity has not been or cannot
be achieved, or where the issue is one in which rights and interests peculiar to one or
several powers only are involved."

Inasmuch as Japan has just been illustrating in Shantung, with the approval of all the powers, that when "rights and interests peculiar to one
power are involved" that power is not bound to "refrain from aggression,"
even this last principle is not binding.
How do we stand on the question of treaty revision?
1927, Secretary Kellogg made this statement:

On January 27th,

"The Government of the United States is ready now to continue the negotiations
on the entire subject of the tariff and extraterritorialiy, or to take up negotiations on
behalf of the United States alone. The only question is with whom it shall negotiate.
If China can agree upon the appointment of delegates representing the authorities or the
people of the country, we are prepared to negotiate such a treaty. However, existing
treaties which were ratified by the Senate cannot be abrogated by the President, but must

Page 7
be superseded by new treaties negotiated by somebody representing China."

Unfortunately this was only a statement to the press. If it had also
been handed to the Chinese minister, it would have indicated more clearly our
serious intention to negotiate. Both northern and southern factions had acted
through Dr. Sze on occasion, and such responsible students of Oriental politics as Grover Clark of the Peking Leader, the Right Reverend Alfred A .
Gilman of Wuchang, China, Congressman Stephen Porter and Thomas Millard believed negottation to be possible. A nation that plunges so hopefully
into disarmament conferences should not be afraid to "lose face" in China.
Our Government should make every effort to utilize the present visit of
the Nationalist Delegation to \Vashington as a means toward effecting revision of our treaties with China. The ationalist Government has been for
more than a year the most effective and far-reaching administrative body in
China. We have recognized it sufficiently to negotiate with it towards a
settlement of the losses suffered by Americans at Nanking last year. If a
government is responsible enough to pay an indemnity, it is responsible
enough to be recognized. In all probability the 1 ationalists will succeed
in breaking up the northern dictatorship. Their next great problem will
be to maintain control over the factions within their own ranks. If the United
States recognizes the Nanking administration as the legal government of
China, their task of maintaining the solidarity of their party will be much
simpler.

THE PRESENT SITUATION
A recent dispatch from Washington says that when the Nationalist
Government controls China south of the Great Wall the United States Government
(1) Will agree to recognize it, provided that foreign treaties will be respected ·until
changed by orderly process.
(2) Troops and gunboats in the interior will be withdrawn when a stable, central
government demonstrates its ability to protect American property interests and American
citizens.
(4) This Government is willing to begin negotiations immediately upon recognition.
(5) Active American support is promised against any move to divide China into
foreign spheres of influence, or to take possession of Chinese territory.

One would like to believe that this policy will be put into effect as it
stands, and as simple people read it, but there is no reason to believe that it
will be any less subject to de-vitalization than were the Washington Conference Treaties. Only a few months ago a few of the larger American firms
in Shanghai formed a committee to raise a fund of $1,000,000 for publicity in
favor of intervention in China. Foreigners abroad do not want to pay higher
tariffs, nor are they willing, the majority of them, to relinquish a system
wher eby they enjoy privileges they could not have at home.
A ll of the powers haYe agreed that Japan has special privileges in
Manc huria and eastern :.rongolia. which constitute at least a "for eign
sphere of influence," if not actual alienation of Chinese territory. The general opinion is that a separate state will be made out of Manchuria, and that
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Chang Tso-lin will be retained as gO\·ernor, under a virtual Japanese protectorate. O r if Chang Tso-lin proves too refractory, the young l\fanchu Emperor may be restored to the throne of his h ereditary kingdom. The 15,000,000 Chinese in Manchuria are not at all reconciled to the domination of the
125,000 od d Japanese who have settled there. Eventually the United State3
must take sides, or else back out of 'Number 5 as gracefu lJ y as we can.*
~

If the outlawry of war treaties now pending between the United States,
Japan, and the European powers go into effect, and no definite safeguard be
taken of Chinese interests, Japan can carve out a kingdom for herself comprising not . on ly Manchuria and Eastern Mongolia, but Shantung and. Chihli.
and we can offer only a ver bal protest. Great Britain can take Tibet-if she
wishes. A n incontrovertible recognition of Chin ese sovereignty throughout
Chinese territory is the only way in which the "Open Door Policy" can be
preserved if these join t agreements to refrain from offensive warfare be ratified, and taken seriously.

And in the meantime Europe watches us apprehensively, and, we may
be assured, does not confine h erself to watching. Why? Because, to quote
Lloyd George:
"If the Chinese get it in their heads that some nations are their friends and others
their enemies, the trade will be captured by those who are believed Ito be friends."

This is why "Senator Borah's suggestion that the State Department mediate between
Japan and China during the present crisis has not created a favorable reaction among
European governments with Asiatic interests. America's Oriental influence is as great
as is consistent with the welfare of other Occidental nations." (From the Geneva correspondent to the N. Y. Herald-Tribune, 5/14/28.)

Has the United States a Chinese policy? Not if by policy is meant a
consis t ent and effective course of action. We have a few traditions: The d evelopmen t of trade, reluctance to commit aggressions, the desire to "play
safe," the desire to befriend when this is not too hazardous. We have committed ourselves on pape r to the doing of courageous and honorable things:
T o the fulfillment of treaties, to the renunciation of unjust privileges, to th e
recognition that human rights are the same in a ll countries, and at that point
ou r diplomatic clock ran down. One of two things will happen. Either our
democracy will prove its effectiveness and the desire of the people t o express
their genuine friendliness through these pledges wi ll be fe lt; or we shall continue t o make amiable promises, and wait until the Chinese are able to force
us to put th em into effect.
COMMITTEE ON PUBLICATIONS.
•As a matter of fact, the United States has for many years recognized Japan's "peculiar
interest" in Manchuria. During his administration President Roosevelt expressed this very definit ely: "The vita l interest of the United States is to keep Japan out of our country, ancl at the
same time to preserve the good will of Japan. The vital interest of the Japanese, on the other
hand. is in Manchuria and Korea. It is therefore peculiarly our interest not to tal<e any steps as
r egards Manchuria which will give the Japanese cause to f eel, with or without r eason, that we
are hostile to them, or a menace in however slight a deg1·ee to their interests."
Last year, our Government once more sanctioned Japanese domination in Manchuria and
Mongolia by acquiescing to the Tanaka "positive" policy. In November, It even appeared that
the Japanese South Manchurian Railway was to receive a $30,000,000 Joan from the firm of J.P.
Morgan and Company. Resolute public opposition to the loan, both in China and this countr y ,
preYented its ultimate approval by the State Department.
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THE TSINANFU INCIDENT
During the last thirty years, Shantung Province has been the scene of foreign and
Chinese invasions, and the subject of much public and diplomatic discussion.
In 1898 Germany demanded from China as reparation for the murder of two missionaries, the district in Shantung known as Kiaochow, which included the port of Tsingtao, an ideal site for a naval base. She also acquired the right to build a railway to
Tsinanfu, the capital, 225 miles inland, to a given strip of land on either side of the railway, and to coal and salt mines as well as certain telegraph and cable privileges. In
1914, when Japan entered the war, she saw an excellent opportunity to get rid of a
dangerous rival and seized the German interests in Shantung on the pretext that she was
acting only as temporary guardian and would turn them 0\'er to China. She extended
her control not only over the German interests, but over Tsinanfu and Chinese towns
along the railroad. The German property she had appropriated she sold to Japanese.
Section I of the "Twenty-one Demands" gave Japan exclusive control of Shantung.
\\'hen, at the vVashington Conference, she relinquished her political privileges in Shantung, he retained the German mines and properties which she had confiscated. The
Chinese were given permission to redeem the Tsingtao-Tsinan railroad, but not by
immediate payment in full as they proposed at the time. Instead, Japan required a gradual redemption through a period of from five to fifteen years, thus retaining a mortgage
on the road*
Geographically, Shantung is a strategic province. If the Nationalists are to control
Peking, they must control Shantung. Otherwise the northern capital will he between
two hostile forces: Japan in Manchuria and the northern war-lords and Japan in Shantung. The railroad from Shanghai to Tientsin and also the disputed railway to Tsingtao
pass through Tsinanfu, the capital. Here also is situated the great railroad bridge across
the Yellow River. The force that holds this city can control movements of troops anrl
supplies north, south and east.
When the Nationalist Army started north in April of this year, unexpected complications arose which resulted in serious conAict betw<'en the advancing Chinese and the Japanese troops stationed at Tsinanfu. Early in the disturbance the Chinese wireless station
was destroyed by the Japanese, with the result that Chinese communications were disorganized and the world received the Japanese version through Tokio, Lonrlon. Peking
and the Shanghai foreign settlement. Later reports, coming from Thomas Millard, the
Foreign Policy Association, our representative in China, and other dependable and conservative sources give a more balanced account.
On April 30th the Nationalist Army reached Tsinanfu. A force of 3,000 Japanesf•
soldiers was quartered there. Until May 3rd, everything was peaceful. Then fighting
broke out for a cause which seems still undeterminedt. The Japanese used armored cars
and field artillery to clear the settlement. Orders were given on both sides to stop firing,
but word could not be gotten through to isolated units for some time. Meanwhile, the
Chinese Special Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Tsai Kung Tsi, was murdered with
his staff of ten by the Japanese. On May 5th, everything was quiet, and the main part
of the army prepared to continue northward, leaving local adjustments to the Foreign
Ministry. At this time, Chiang Kai-shih sent the followinig circular telegram to hi,
generals:
"At the outset of the northern expedition we proclaimed to the peoples of all friendly
nations that our object was to reach the goal of the revolution, and also at the same
time announced that wherever our soldiers went they must protect both native and foreign
li\·es and property. Unexpectedly occupying Tsinanfu caused a misunderstanding between
the Japanese and ourselves. The military must resume the northern advance and entrust
the Foreign Ministry to make a settlement with Japan. All should instruct the soldiers
to protect the. consulates, nationals, and property of friendly powers, and suppress propaganda slogans which are injurious to international friendship. Do not allow your indignation to disrupt these projects."
On May 7th, after Chiang Kai-shih's departure, the Japanese commander, General
*Payments on the 40,000,000 yen bond issue whereby the railway was to be redeemed are
now tw·o yearf.i in arrPars, due to unsettled conditions.
tThe Japanese claim that thP Chinese soldierR began to loot JapaneHe shops. The Chinese
official report is that a f'hinese general. Ho Yao-tsu, disobeyed orders and tried · to billet his
troops in Tsinanfu City. The Japanese tried to disarm his troops before permitting them to come
out, and shooting ensued.
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Fukuda, presented a 12-hour ultimaturn to the Chinese officer in command, compnsmg
the following demands: (1) The Chinese commander responsible for the disorder to he
severely punishe_d. (2) Troops engaged in the anti-Japanese outbreak to be disarmed.
(3) All warlike acts against the Japanese to cease. (4) The Xationalist troops to withdraw to seven miles on either side of the Shantung Railway, and beyond the foreign
settlement.
The Chinese commander asked for a 24-hour extension on the ultimatum, for he
had neither the authority nor sufficient time to accomplish these things, but hi s rcquc>t
was rejected, and when the time set had elap eel, the Japanese, who in the meantime had
received a reinforcement of 2,000, set about forcibly to disarm the Chinese. These
naturally resisted. Finally the Japanese on May 9th began a general bom bardment of
the city, in the course of which the city wall was destroyed in two places. The Ia t <>f
the Chinese soldiers were disarmed and clriwn out. After their departure the J apa tw <c
invited the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to take over the administration o f the city
and public utilities, but three days later they resumed control. The Chinese populati n;,
have been leaving the city in large numbers since the Japanese occupation. Japanese
forces numbering 28,000 are to be in Shantung by the end of May, supposedly to protect
the 17,000 Japanese in Tsinanfu and Tsingtao. The conservative press estimate of
casualties is 57 Japanese killed and 184 wounded; 2,200 Chinese killed and wounded.
The immediate results of the Tsinanfu incident are not so important. The Nationalist
advance was rather badly weakened by it. Japan claims that her only purpose in interfering
was to protect her nationals at Tsinanfu (about 1,500 in all, the majority of whom arc
small shopkeepers), and the railroad from Tsingtao. There are about 100 additional
foreigners in Tsinanfu, 12 of whom are Americans. Foreign opinion in China generally
approved Japan's alleged purpose, but felt that she had "blundered" in method. The
spontaneous reaction of all the Japanese papers save one was to condemn the Govern·
ment's action. Public opinion in England was apprehensive, fearing that Japan might
have seized this opportunity to retake Shantung. This is the general Chinese belief, too.
\Vhatever Japan's purpose, she has put herself in a position either to defeat the Nationalist
campaign or to bring pressure to bear on a victorious Nationalist Government.
The most serious point brought out by the Tsinanfu incident is the inefficacy of
international agreements to protect weak nations. The Japanese had no legal right to
send troops to Tsinanfu. "Both Shanghai and Tientsin have distinct areas under foreign
control provided for by treaties and therefore the use of foreign military forces to protect
those areas is legitimate and involves no technical encroachment on China's sovereignty
or territorial integrity," writes Thomas Millard in the New York Herald-Tribune, May
15, 1928. "No special foreign residence areas exist anywhere in Shantung, which is purely
Chinese and under a solely Chinese administration. Japan's action in sending troops to
Shantung was taken without treaty sanction, and when analyzed was done. to protect
property. All the powers except Japan advised their nationals to withdraw."
The difficulty is that the powers are not prepared to dispute Japan's right to do this.
None of them has been too nice in its interpretation of treaties. Furthermore, curtailment
of foreign troop movements in China sets an embarrassing precedent. Japan's action
will probably precipitate a more or Jess successful boycott which will divert that much
trade to other nations. England wishes to keep on good terms with Japan, as being the
logical curb to Russia; while the United States has for many years been friendly to
Japan, and has made rather extensive loans to her. And so, when Ambassador Matsudaira informs the State Department that Japan is respecting the Conference agreement
to observe China's sovereignty, etc .. etc., we agree that this is so. When the Nanking
Government asks the United States to mediate, we consent on condition that Japan
will put in a request also, which she will not conceivably do. And when the Nationalist
Government Council, invoking Article XI of the League Covenant ("Any war or threat
of war, whether immediately affecting any members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action
that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the nations."), asks its
consideration of these matters, the League declares that it is powerless to act until the
matter shall have been laid before it by a recognized member, that is, by Japan or the
Peking faction. As matters stand, Japan is slated to make a report on the incident at
the regular session in June.
The Tsinanfu incident is a bad example for a nation "bound" by unwelcome treaties.
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The American Committee for Fair Play in China was
ganizecl in San Francisco in June, 1925, shortly after
cl~monstra.tion in Shanghai which resulted in the shooting
Chinese students by the foregin police. The purpose of
founders was to create an agency through which
and timely information concerning China might
available to the JWOJllt' of this country, with the
'that out of such work will grow a broader
umler~tanding between the East and the West, an'l
guarantee of peace among nations.
ln pursuance of this aim it has sponsored and a
it>ctur< s and public meetings, furnished material for
an<l S!Wnk(•rs. distributed publicity to periodicals,
lished and llistrbiuted 42,000 r(<ports on various topics
with phases of the situation in China, and the life of her
p!e. It has from the beginning been a volunteer mnvenoe:n
I.Joth in matter of support and of
of unavoidable cost expenditures.
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A few books on China. in the main new, and vet-y good
"China. A Xation in Evolution." Paul Monroe. ::11acmlllan
"In China," by Abel Bannard (awarded the grand
prize by the French Academy), Dutton; "The China
Book, 1928." H. G. vi·. VloodhPacl, University of Ch
Press; "The Youth Movement in China." Tsi C. Wang.
Repui.Jiic, New York, pu!Jiish~rs; "China, Where It Is
\Vhy," 'l'homas F. l\1illarcl. Harcourt, Brace and
"Th~se From the Land of Sinim." Sir Robert Hart, Ch
ami Hall, London, 1901.
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'rhe China Famine Reli~f is trying to raise
alleviate the sufferings of the ChinE>se starving in
It is estimated that 4,000.000 J>eople are facing qt~rvn"''"
this province, while 6,000,000 others are seriously
Any he!p will be gratefully rE>ceived at the Relief Headqu
tPrs. 419 Fourth Avenue, NPw York City.
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'ro those interested in making a closer study
lean relations, we recommend the following books and
of which we have made use in preparing this
Outline History of China," Gowan and Hall; "The
Policy of the United States," Henry Chung; "Our
Question," Thomas F. :\Wiard; "Int<>rnational Relations
the Chinef<e Empire." H. B. Morse; "Official Report of
"·ashington Conference"; "China Today-Political," S
K. Hornbeck (World Peace Foundation) ; Report of the
tratE>rritoriality Commission, State Department Records;
torial Information Service Reports of the Foreign
Association; Dispatches of l\1illard to the New York
Tribune.

We urge our readers to follow the course of events in China, and to use their influence, locally and
communication with the State Department, to encourage an independent American policy in China, based on
effective revision of the unilateral treaties between our two countries.
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Now that China ' s political future seems a little
brighter, -V<re want to emphasize in our bull etins other phases of
her natio"lal lif e--· so cie. l ~ economic ~ and educati onal--which are
quite as funda~ental issuez as the political phase , and even mor e
ne c essary to ur..derstand if the i:;:npending treaty refor:::1.s a r e to
prove really effective . An enlightened foreign policy ca.."l suecoed only throug~ the force of enlightened public opinion .
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In order that we may cortinue as a.n educat i onal
and not I!'..orely an emergenc:r org£1.'J.i zatioE_. ·we must abandon our old
pla~1 of f:b.:ancing throuf;h voluntG.ry co:rctributions, which has here tofore limited ou.r activity either to t i mes of general prosperity
or pol itical crisis . We -:,ra::::..t to estabL.sh the American Committee
on. a J!',e.:J.bm:ship oasis • and en close a card on which \'ie hopo you will _____
enroll yourself as an active or subscribing member. The dues a r e
not large . 'Ne believe that our vtork o:1titles us to the consideration of all who hav e r eceived our bulletins. If a reasonA.ble ~ r o port:..on of them respond , ''re can carry out our schedule of six b 'lll ct i ns a year and grow healthi ly. The need. of a spiritual r o.pprocllement between Jch e East a--,_d t he West is not a sensational issue ,
but it is OLe of t he most fundamental needs of our age , and must
be mot eventually . lie hope you vvill give our proposal s e riou:"Sand
synpathetic con sideration.
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Those who
$3 . 00 or more towar ds our last budget are
automatically members . Others who gave less, may beco::1.e !:lembers
by sending us the dif'fere'lce with the enclosed. c i:rd. Vlhatever
the response to this l etter, we shall maintain our existence as
a Conunittee at the above address." But t:1e p'..lblication of further
bulletins depends Pnti r e ly u p on thed~r-ec of support we receive.

